Introduction
In early 1959, Luiz Rendall Silva, Cape Verdean administrator of the concelho (district) of Fogo, on the volcano island of that name in the Sotavento group (Leeward Islands), wrote a very energetic report to his Portuguese superiors. He complained to the Governor of Cape Verde about the lack of decisiveness in Portugal's colonial welfare policy, and about the absence of clear programmes for the future of the islands. In his words, he wished "for the improvement of the Cape Verdean land and for the benefit of its populations, and for a more visible advancement of the civilising mission." 1 While his chosen expressions belonged to the standard repertoire of colonial ideological terminology, his tone was sharp, leaving no doubt that Rendall Silva saw the local situation as extremely unsatisfactory. He was angry and impatient about the lack of funds to finally deal with the islands' immense social problems, and, above all, with the disastrous effects of drought and malnutrition that repeatedly plagued a considerable part of the Cape Verdean population. Even in the late 1950s, voicing such critique under the conditions of the authoritarian Portuguese state was still a remarkable act.
Hunger was a frequent companion of life on Cape Verde, and this had not only been the case in the twentieth century. 2 The annual rainy season during the summer months had long been critical for the physical survival of a large group of the islanders: if the rains were scarce or did not fall at all, many were menaced by starvation. Periods of drought became more frequent during the twentieth century, as, apart from the general climatic conditions, the effects of land concentration, soil erosion, and overgrazing by cattle damaged the quality of agrarian land. Between 1894 and 1924, an improved colonial statistical service revealed the real impact of drought, as these periods repeated themselves six times in the short interval of thirty years. After the Second World War, conditions remained dramatic. Between 1940 Between and 1942 Between , in 1947 Between and 1948 , and between 1956 and 1958 respectively, three prolonged periods of severe drought prevailed on the archipelago. They killed tens of thousands of the Cape Verdeans. 3 Other islanders emigrated whenever possible; in those years they became desperate enough to accept contract labour on the In spite of scholarly neglect of its history during the 1940s and 1950s, Cape Verde is in fact a particularly interesting case for understanding the effect of late colonial reform on the attitudes of African elites. 16 It makes sense to conceptualise the years between the beginning of the Second World War and the initial phase of the anti-colonial wars against Portuguese rule from 1961 as the first principal phase of Portugal's late colonial experience. From 1939, there was a dramatic combination of the peak of Portugal's colonial economic exploitation with climatic and agrarian difficulties on the Cape Verdean Islands; a period of weak rainfalls triggered malnutrition and epidemics that affected a huge percentage-i.e. tens of thousands-of the inhabitants. At the same time, the Portuguese colonial state had fully entered into a dynamic of maximum exploitation of colonial populations, which made it near to impossible to devise plans to help colonial subjects threatened by poverty and famine. In 1961 the Second National Development Plan for the overseas provinces had just started to be implemented, but the anti-colonial wars already had a strong effect on decisions for colonial reform. The Portuguese empire was transformed into an empire under siege, and, far more strongly than for the period before, any reform steps have to be read against the background of countering tendencies towards "radicalisation" and revolt within the colonies.
In contrast to other colonial administrations, the administration of Cape Verde was one that was in large part composed by an African elite. Therefore, on the archipelago, the links between colonial development and elite attitudes were more immediate than in other African countries. The late colonial experience, with new demands and offers for reform eventually taken up by the Cape Verdean administrative elite, can therefore be expected to be particularly interesting. There are two methodological approaches to study this experience of Cape Verdean administrators under the Portuguese late colonial state. First, social anthropologists interpret the experience of Cape Verdeans through an interview-based approach. 17 This methodology tends to generate vivid accounts, which however have some considerable weaknesses: the remaining informants for the 1940s and 1950s are now at a very old age if alive; they have lived through at least fifty years of massive political shifts; and many of the surviving witnesses reside in "exile" in Portugal. Hence, with regard to these very much-politicised themes, it is highly problematic to come to balanced interview results. Existing literature relying on anthropological data undoubtedly has its merits, but needs to be complemented by the historian's approach-an approach that leads to an interpretation of the great quantity of archival data that has so far been unexplored. In these respects, the analysis I make is based on a new set of sources, and will help social anthropologists and sociologists to continue with their own studies on the safer ground of an elaborated historical interpretation.
An Ambiguous Elite: Cape Verdeans as Late Colonial Officials Under Portuguese Rule
An administrator on the islands of Santiago or Fogo such as Rendall Silva worked in principle for the Portuguese colonial state, under the authoritarian and right wing Estado Novo of Prime Minister António Oliveira Salazar. Being a Cape Verdean, however, he would not be treated as a typical Portuguese official by his European colleagues in the imperial services. By contrast, he would usually be subject to at least some racist preconceptions from colonial officials at higher echelons of the administrative hierarchy. 18 As a native of Cape Verde, he was a member of a numer-ous peer group that in the 1940s and 1950s had found employment in a large number of administrative positions, including some rather important posts. This strong Cape Verdean presence in the islands' colonial administration becomes obvious from a relatively long list of non-White government employees drafted by the colonial government of Cape Verde in 1957; the fact that the governor felt it necessary to send such a document to the Lisbon central authorities also shows how concerned Portuguese administrators were with regard to the dominance of African officials in this part of the "multi-racial empire."
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Indeed, Cape Verdean officials in the Portuguese service played, without any surprise, a double role. They functioned both, and at the same time, as representatives of the government and as members of, and occasional advocates for, the African subjects. The Cape Verdeans may have had a mestiço identity that distanced them from the African populations in other Portuguese territories, but administrators born as Creoles on the archipelago also were members of a distinctive African population. 20 While the central goal of my analysis is to observe how the mentalities of those administrators developed under the conditions of the late colonial state (between 1939 and 1961), it is obvious that Cape Verdean administrators had access to some levers to affect the material well-being of people on the islands: individuals like Rendall Silva were thus likely to have a more engaged interest in the advancement of the Cape Verdean infrastructure and economy. Even more, being Africans who experienced their share of racial discrimination under Portuguese colonial rule, officials from the archipelago were possible candidates to engage in anti-colonial activities. This would have been even more likely in a period in which other parts of West Africa already had their sails set for the process towards decolonisation.
It is a common story that Cape Verdeans participated very actively in anticolonial resistance. However, the examples we have for that are mostly set outside of Cape Verde. Patrick Chabal points in this context to individuals like the brothers Amílcar and Luís Cabral or to future Cape Verdean president Aristides Pereira, among other activists of the liberation movement, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e do Cabo Verde (PAIGC), in Guinea-Bissau. Chabal has argued that those Cape Verdeans were able to become important leaders in the anti-colonial struggle particularly because they had overcome the ethnically framed tensions between Cape Verdean "mestiços" and Guinean "Africans," and had created a sort of Lusophone pan-African elite sentiment. 21 This may be true for a distinctive Lusophone elite, who frequently shared a common background of student life in and around Portuguese universities (and true only for a certain period, because when Luís Cabral's government was overthrown in 1980, the coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau profited from negative feelings against the alleged dominance of Cape Verdean "mestiços" within the Guinean population). 22 Things are more complicated for the bulk of Cape Verdean administrators, who normally had not passed through university studies. They were mostly qualified through secondary school education in São Vicente (or Santiago) and they never worked in specialised services or departments, where the agronomist Amílcar Cabral had been employed. To the contrary, those Cape Verdeans filled the posts related to direct control of the African populations. As we will see, throughout the empire, the respective Cape Verdean officials often followed a corporate logic that distanced them from the locals and motivated them to remain relatively loyal to the instructions of higher-ranking Portuguese officials. 23 In theory, Cape Verdean officials working in other Portuguese colonies could have sympathised with the fate of oppressed African populations, as they witnessed face to face the many hardships brought about by administration by the Portuguese Estado Novo: forced labour was until 1961 ever-present in the Portuguese colonial empire, as was corporal punishment, which according to the native code (indigenato) remained a legitimate option for every Portuguese administrator. 24 However, elite Cape Verdeans behaved as members of a Creole community when in service in the other African overseas provinces. 25 They enjoyed particular privileges in terms of political and legal status and were frequently subject to an antagonism formulated in racial terms by African locals in the respective regions. 26 For Cape Verdean administrators on their home islands, the situation was different-and still more complicated. On the one hand, they had an evident opportunity to become lawyers of the commoners on the islands, and they frequently had family ties to long-established dynasties on the archipelago, which, in principle, guaranteed the connection between those local authorities and a nascent "civil society." On the other hand, however, they emphasised their elite role and distanced themselves very strongly from the "normal" islanders. Those who left Cape Verde to live in Portuguese exile after 1975 continued to insist on their role as an imperial elite. 27 Moreover, in spite of being themselves victims of occasional racist comments, several Cape Verdean officials would nonetheless fully embrace the rhetoric of the Estado Novo. Rendall Silva, for instance, was a strong promoter of the Moçidade Portuguesa, the right-wing youth movement, and an adversary of the apparent trend towards political liberalisation during the 1958 elections. Although living in an authoritarian system made it, of course, more difficult to give opinions that would have been in opposition to the propaganda of the regime, no one forced him to be such an ardent follower of party institutions. In a way Rendall Silva's attitudes are, however, typical for the late colonial state: they combine both authoritarian behaviour and belief in modernism, critique against racism, and a feeling of belonging more to the imperial structure than being part of an 'indigenous' population. 28 I show in the following section how, in the 1940s, Cape Verdean officials would, facing the prospect of socio-economic crisis, extend their freedom of manoeuvre inside the framework of the colonial state. I also analyse the particular ways in which they challenged the desperate logic of recurrent drought and passiveness that characterised Portugal's colonial regime on the archipelago.
Passiveness and Disaster: The Early 1940s on Cape Verde's Southern Islands
In 1939 the general socio-economic situation was already more or less disastrous in the Sotavento group of the Cape Verdean Islands. Not only was drought a permanent enemy, in the 1930s epidemic diseases were also endemic. On the island of Santiago, malaria had become widespread in spite of the limited number of breeding places for mosquitoes-poverty and hygiene problems were sufficient to allow for the spread of the vector. In the 1930s, many islanders preferred emigration to the French-ruled territory of Senegal to life in Praia. Faced with such challenges, the colonial administration was completely under-funded even in the capital city of the territory: the Cape Verdean administrator Bento Levy, who was in charge of local government of the capital district, claimed he neither had the funds to clean the administrative buildings properly, nor even a sum adequate to pay a decent linen hardcover for the annual government yearbook, the boletim oficial! 29 Under these circumstances, it was hard to imagine any well-funded initiatives against poverty on the Sotavento island chain. As late as in the second half of the 1940s, newly installed administrators in the Praia concelho would complain that they did not have available any inventories, statistics, or budget data. There had not been any financial base to organise real bookkeeping, as the whole of the administrative services was running on the most rudimentary level.
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The smaller Sotavento islands were still worse off. On Maio, the administrator claimed that while the island's inhabitants were "full of humility, respectful, and earnest," the infrastructure of the island was nothing but ruins. The administration, in 1939, even lacked the most basic means as would have been necessary for the erection of fences to impede half-wild animals entering the farms of local peasants, and thus to protect the minimum base of agricultural output. 31 The central government of Cape Verde gave priority only to repression: they invested considerable energy to spot and arrest "subversive elements" among the few islanders who had passed through basic education. 32 There was, to the contrary, not even a tentative plan to improve the islands' overall infrastructure. The first complaints of Cape Verdean administrators, occasionally angered by the lack of engagement on the part of the colonial power, did not have any effect.
In Tarrafal, the northern district of Santiago Island, the Cape Verdean administrator complained that there was little energy shown by the officials of the Portuguese central administration, as those were "merely bureaucrats." With the upcoming hunger crisis of 1941/2, there was in the beginning no initiative to demand extra food rations for poor families, and any visible engagement in model agriculture, which appeared to be one possible way to escape from the recurrent crises, was virtually unheard of. The administrator was indeed worried that a return of the hunger crisis would lead to complete demographic disaster in Tarrafal District (which was not far from the truth). However, he did not become at all active. 33 More activity was shown by the Cape Verdean administrator of Santa Catarina District on Santiago, Augusto Barreto de Carvalho, who recommended better education facilities in the rural areas, to teach peasants enhanced practices in local agriculture, and an improved organisation of communal granaries: both were popular ideas to counter renewed hunger crises. 34 With this attitude of actively demanding improvements from the colonial government, Barreto de Carvalho was a precursor of the new style that would become far louder in the second half of the 1940s (and which primarily demanded more basic education, although this definitely was a simplistic solution). However, even in 1944 he was still a lonely voice.
Moreover, there is no sign that there was a transfer of information about the concrete difficulties of the islands' economic situation. European officials who happened to work on Cape Verde could have been an important pressure group to enforce improvements with the colonial ministry in Lisbon. However, at least until the end of the 1930s, this group seems to have remained silent. After all, there were far more prestigious positions elsewhere in comparison to administrative posts on the archipelago-and to obtain in the end a position as district governor in Angola or Mozambique, it was advantageous not to be too critical with the official governmental policy of the Estado Novo.
Thus, even after the first of the two dramatic famines of the 1940s, there were few signs of open activity by Cape Verdean administrators in the Portuguese colonial service. Interestingly, the highest government officials in the islands already feared the Cape Verdean administrators as a dangerous source of challengeswhich was not yet the case. 35 While everyone agreed that the famine years of 1941 and 1942 had been years of "sad memory," the experience of widespread hunger was still discussed as a phantom that somehow appeared and disappeared. Even from the perspective of Cape Verdean officials, not much was to be done. Moreover, while some insisted that generous loans should be given to needy and starving peasants by the local administration, those same administrators held that the situation was, in total, the peasants' own fault. 36 An official such as David Prates da Silva bemoaned the lack of knowledge Cape Verdean peasants showed in putting their lands to good use, but he believed that any attempt at improving these conditions via more basic education was wasted. More clearly, he did not feel responsible to start any initiative. 37 For the elite group of Cape Verdean administrators, there were no precedents indicating that the colonial state really was in any obligation to help 'ordinary' Cape Verdean peasants. Negative comments about these peasants were frequent, and even more so if the respective officials were stationed on the remote islands, like Brava or Maio in the case of the Sotavento group. If those officials attributed responsibility for the grave situation on the Cape Verdean Islands, they often blamed the local populations for their passiveness and apathy, and, eventually, attacked fellow officials for being too lax when it came to enforcing discipline:
It is regrettable, however, that this people are not intelligent and not hardworking...And its situation illustrates, nearly constantly, that there are officials who, as being disinterested in all the issues respecting the island, do not try to divert them from their wrong ways.
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A Turning Point: The Shock of 1947
The first years of the 1940s had seen severe devastation by drought on the Cape Verdean Islands, including thousands dying of starvation. In 1942/3 the situation was grave enough to motivate some members of the Cape Verdean elite to act clandestinely. In a letter to the British Consulate in São Vicente, an anonymous writer-very probably a Cape Verdean member of the administration-sent a report to the "United Nations" (meaning in this case the alliance against the Axis during the Second World War), hoping for British, United States, and Soviet support, and requesting the "liberation" of the islanders from Portuguese mismanagement. He underlined his claim with numbers about death rates and photographs depicting starving peasant communities. 39 Given the low level of protest among Cape Verdean administrators during this first hunger crisis of the 1940s, we must assume that the author of this report did still not represent a broader movement.
Things became even worse, however, in the second half of the decade, due tothe cumulative effects of two subsequent natural disasters. As a result of the first drought, malnutrition and lack of daily intake of calories had weakened many of the surviving islanders, in particular the inhabitants of rural zones. The physical state of local populations was sufficiently grave for recurrent drought to bring a still worse catastrophe, as health service doctors had already warned in 1944/5. The disaster occurred in 1947, when the rains on Cape Verde again failed.
In the five years between the first and the second devastating drought of the 1940s, the Portuguese Colonial Ministry-well in line with Minister Vieira Machado's basic objective to save funds-had blocked any further initiatives to prepare for future disasters. Somehow symbolically, even plans for an improvement of access to fresh water from volcanic sources had been abandoned. Therefore, the renewed crisis of 1947, if not at all coming as a surprise, was not met with any existing emergency plan on the part of the colonial administration. Eighty per cent of the inhabitants of the concelho of Praia needed immediate assistance. 40 Generalised malnutrition on Santiago Island also hit the old plans for an improvement in the educational sector, a question that had dominated reform debates in Cape Verde since the First World War. In the countryside, pupils would leave their schools to help in agriculture wherever they could, in a desperate attempt at coping with the effects of the drought. 41 Other male adolescents, sometimes more successfully, sought employment in public works-one of the few methods by which they could guarantee themselves a meagre income that effectively protected them from physical poverty, but not a very secure one in the long run, as even in the 1940s there were few public works initiated by the colonial government. 42 However, both forms of temporary leave from the villages undermined plans for a better education pro-gramme on Santiago Island and elsewhere, and probably aggravated the long-term consequences of the crisis.
More than in 1942/3, Cape Verdean administrators were traumatised by the particularly dramatic forms of the experience of the hunger crisis. At this crucial moment, an attitude of protest based on the theoretical ideals of Portuguese colonialism emerged, initiated by a colonial inspector who happened to serve as the Administrator of Praia concelho, António Policarpo de Sousa Santos. The colonial inspectorate in Lisbon was a main stronghold of colonial reform, and embodied in a way the demands of the late colonial state: from the early 1940s onwards, most of its members were extremely critical of the situation of colonial administration and the treatment of African populations. The fact that Sousa Santos sent the governor an accusing memorandum in place of his usual four-monthly report is not too surprising for a colonial inspector. What is indeed exceptional is the fact that he wrote this memorandum operating as administrator, and interacting with other, Cape Verdean administrators. Sousa Santos's protest against conditions seen no longer as compatible with the ideals of Portugal's (late) colonial state, was an important trigger for a repositioning of the Cape Verdean administrative elite between 1948 and 1960.
Sousa Santos was, in fact, aware of the extraordinary nature of his report. His descriptions were biting, and they seem as a whole very accurate. Taking up his post in September 1947, the administrator was profoundly scandalised and shaken by the situation of starving refugees (the majority of whom were male adults coming from the rural districts of Santiago). Of those starving peasants a part-"vagrants and beggars," according to the local police-was interned on the Ilhéu, the rocky island facing the beaches of the city of Praia. The inhabitants of this camp died in the hundreds from hunger, weakness, and epidemics, and their dead bodies were daily fished from the bay. The administrator was outraged by the practice of internment, which in his view was a sign of neglect, bad planning, and lack of interest on the part of the colonial government of Cape Verde. He protested to the governor with extremely harsh words:
When arriving here [at the Ilhéu] my hairs stood upright as I saw the state of some hundreds of those creatures who had been thrown on this land for the simple crime that they had begged for things they lacked: that is, for food, which would help them kill the hunger that tormented them. Moreover, your excellence, in no other land of the world, including even Soviet Russia with all its barbarian practices, in savage Germania, or in Asia with all its exotic manners, would the fact that they beg us to stop their hunger be enough of a grave crime to merit such horrible punishment. 43 This was still not everything Sousa Santos had to say; his critique filled pages. Moreover, he immediately took practical measures: he evacuated the Ilhéu, created an asylum in an old residence, and indirectly forced the members of the central government services to act by putting the problem back again under their noses. Under Sousa Santos's direction, in the concelho of Praia, more than a thousand beggars were provided with food and shelter in the residence, and in the infirmary a total of 3,500 persons were temporarily lodged. After Policarpo de Sousa Santos took over, the funds spent for social assistance grew to a level sixty times higher than the preceding month, climbing from a mere 619 Portuguese escudos to a sum nearing 38,500. 44 It seems that most of the Cape Verdean officials who had been passive or at least silent during the months before followed Sousa Santos's lead, and took part, rather eagerly, in the aid process. Particularly in the urban district of Nossa Senhora da Graça, but also in most of the other districts of the city of Praia, the provision of clothes was another philanthropic exercise the administration finally engaged in.
Like his Cape Verdean colleague, Rendall Silva, on Fogo Island eleven years later, Sousa Santos was not a "liberal." To the contrary, his attitudes were well entrenched in the ideology of the Estado Novo. We have some documentation at our disposal that illustrates the administrator's attempts to censor the Praia radio station, the Radio Clube de Cabo Verde, which was, Sousa Santos claimed, pro-American and antinational. 45 This attitude earned him the reputation of being "incompetent"-in the 1940s many high Portuguese officials of the central administration of the archipelago had no sympathy for what they regarded as politically over-zealous colleagues! 46 Nonetheless, with his critical report on social conditions, Sousa Santos had overstepped the limits-in particular, his allusion to "barbarism" worse than in the Soviet Union was obviously not to the taste of higher officials-and his interim position ended rapidly. However, he had given a decisive impulse, which would in 1949 be retaken by the colonial inspector, António de Almeida, who-himself a long-time resident of Cape Verde-visited the islands and confirmed and retransmitted the impressions given by Sousa Santos. 47 As the problems discussed by both inspectors would remain symptomatic, this critique constituted the fundament for a catalogue of demands that Cape Verdean officials would formulate with regard to the colonial state. Moreover, the shock that Sousa Santos and Almeida had expressed in their reports was shared in the collective memory of their Cape Verdean colleagues. After 1947, it was accompanied by the activities of the literary and intellectual movement around the review Claridade, in which the Creole elite reacted to the hunger crisis through cultural expressions. 48 A direct influence of Claridade on the opinions of Cape Verdean administrators is difficult to establish, but there is no doubt that the cultural movement went along with a process of increased awareness of the incidence of hunger crises as crises against which the colonial power was insufficiently prepared.
Slow Process to Social Reform: Cape Verdean Administrators in the 1950s
After the shock of the hunger crisis of the late 1940s, and in the light of nascent protest from the milieu of Cape Verdean administrators, first steps toward visible improvement were already being made at the beginning of the new decade. This was particularly tangible in the city of Praia (where the presence and activities of the International Red Cross made it all the more urgent to show foreign observers a visible programme of practical initiatives). The hygienic conditions in Praia became notably better: parts of the slums of Ponta Belém were removed and their inhabitants settled in new houses in Achadinha. Nonetheless, the Cape Verdean administrator José Manuel Gomes sharply criticised the fact that the city was, in spite of all efforts at social assistance, still a shelter for hundreds of beggars who had been victims of rural food scarcity during the crisis. Moreover, Gomes accused the central services of lacking a coherent strategy for improving education, which was, as we have seen, a prominent theme in explaining agricultural failures on Santiago Island. 49 One year later, commenting on the stagnation of further improvement concerning the social and educational situation of the islanders, Gomes insisted that the Portuguese government had to be still far more active. It would be a dramatic error, the administrator held, to wait for the proper initiative of the rural or urban populations of Santiago; apart from a very restricted elite group (in which he counted himself), most of the inhabitants of the island were described by him as lacking a rational understanding of the necessary measures. 50 While this position remained elitist, the concern shown was of a quality that in the late 1930s and early 1940s had not at all been present among Cape Verdean officials. 51 In the more rural parts of Santiago Island, namely in Santa Catarina, improvements of the social situation of the peasants who were stricken by drought and hunger came rather slowly. The Cape Verdean administrator of the district lamented in the middle of the decade that the signs of socio-economic recovery were still limited. 52 In Tarrafal District, the official angrily remarked that the lack of public services for mothers and families was deplorable. 53 The critical tone was indeed sharpened by Cape Verdean administrator Emílio Firmino Benrós. Benrós held that Tarrafal District had good geo-economic conditions to thrive, but that first of all the school infrastructure was to be improved, and that his Portuguese superiors were simply too inactive to speed up matters. Those admonitions had some immediate effects: there would be a visible improvement in the provision of school facilities only months later. 54 The new pressures coming from Cape Verdean officials met with an improved funding situation, through the First National Development Plan, which started in 1953 and showed some effects on the archipelago from 1954. However, it is obvious that the change of attitudes within the Cape Verdean administration was not initially contingent upon the availability of these larger material resources.
In 1954 first careful steps were also made in the direction of an alternative use of the islands. Tourism was a new subject of discussion, albeit one that had to struggle with the problem of the authoritarian nature of Estado Novo structures. Nonetheless, the first coherent plans to open Santiago for tourist groups were pursued from the mid-1950s, in response to pressure by Cape Verdean officials. At the end of the decade, French settlers from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry would start spending their holidays on the islands. 55 In the logic of a bureaucratic reorientation of socio-economic structures, the creation of tourist facilities came as a by-product of creating an infrastructure for officials from the specialised services (houses built in first instance for the temporary lodging of those officials could be used for travellers). 56 It has to be pointed out that the traumatic effects of the 1947 hunger crisis were particularly strong on the two largest Sotavento islands, Santiago and Fogo. On Maio-which was isolated and lacked facilities, and compared to which the other two islands were well equipped-already the first drought of 1942/3 had had such an effect on the Cape Verdean administrator, who openly showed his anger. He complained that in 1942 the Portuguese government of Cape Verde had explained away the drama of thousands dying on the different islands through an unexpected and sudden lack of food. Yet, on Maio, the official held, Portuguese investment was so meagre that deficient health services and hygiene made any high mortality rates an unsurprising fact. In 1944, this administrator, Filipe dos Santos Silva Júnior, holder of a degree in medicine, was still an isolated voice in an isolated position. 57 Only with the 1947 catastrophe was the basis for formulating critique found within the Cape Verdean administrative elite, profiting from the conditions of a slightly liberalised authoritarian regime. In 1947, the new administrator of Maio would bitterly complain about the lack of education facilities and of sanitary posts, and thus join the chorus of critical voices among the Cape Verdean officials. 58 Eight years later, both the access of the islanders to primary school education for their children and the sanitary situation had visibly improved. 59 Conditions on Maio obviously were the most approachable of the problems: for its 2,200 inhabitants, even a minor expansion of Portuguese budget spending brought some notable changes in the overall picture.
As it happened, all over the archipelago local administrations profited from an interval of better rainfall before the middle of the 1950s. This had visible repercussions on emigration, as São Tomé e Príncipe and even Dakar became less attractive destinations. 60 However, the efforts of the administration did not save Cape Verde from renewed crisis in the late 1950s. First of all, the years of better rainfall were not always a blessing to the Sotavento, as they were now likely to cause mud avalanches and accidents. Thus, Rendall Silva complained in early 1957 about the failure of the Portuguese government to respond to the heavy rainfall in the Santa Catarina district of Fogo Island. The Cape Verdean administrator took the occasion to annex to his main yearly report an angry account in which he claimed that none of his recommendations for the improvement of access to drinking water on the island had so far been responded to, and that the populations of the Chã de Caldeiras (the volcano crater) and of the town of Mosteiros had justly protested against the lack of modernisation in that regard. 61 However, while stronger tendencies to socio-economic improvement really paid off only from 1959, the general trend was set through the engagement of Cape Verdean administrators from 1947/8. In 1959, for the first time, even the Estado Novo's Sub-Secretary of State for Overseas Development Issues felt he had to react to the current food crisis on Cape Verde, a consequence of the drought period from 1956 to 1958. His circular had a clear strategic component, as Portuguese government officials were well aware that the failure to deliver the relative material wellbeing of the African populations in the Portuguese colonies was an excellent propaganda theme for any anticolonial movement. Nonetheless, the report also touched upon the image Portuguese officials wanted to give of their overseas empire: according to this image, twenty-to twenty-five thousand new deaths due to the effects of the drought were a "national tragedy" of extremely embarrassing dimensions. 62 As long as Portuguese generosity towards the Cape Verdean Islands had not really been questioned, there had been little possibility for any damning self-critique from the more liberal officials inside the Estado Novo. Now that the initiative of Cape Verdean officials had given an impetus, this perspective would transform itself into a more general attitude of Portuguese high administrators, notably under Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira in 1961 (then additionally motivated by the outbreak of real revolt in Angola). 63 The Sub-Secretary of State for Overseas Development Issues formulated this critique already in 1959:
Given the emotional wave that unequivocally guides the subversion of European political rule in Asia and Africa, and which is only some months away from the removal of the last traces of the colonial empires of the most powerful nations, it is obvious that national stability [of the Portuguese state with its African provinces] can only continue to exist if we show that we boast of factors missing in the cases of other peoples. That means, we have to be "a different case," really different and not only in rhetoric. To fulfil this necessity, the existence of a Portuguese inter-racial community has to rely on solid facts that are profoundly lived: in our hearts, in our blood, in the souls of a people that we call Portuguese on both sides of the sea.
This was all the more important as Cape Verde was, like the rest of the Portuguese colonial empire in the early 1960s, considered a possible theatre for subversion. 66 At the beginning of the decade, rural protest seemed to be on the rise, although in limited zones, and, on Santiago, mostly connected to the spiritual movement of the rabelados. 67 However-as Portuguese officials from the central services understood them-problems in Angola had started in a similar way: with the seemingly limited peasant revolt in the Baixa de Cassange. 68 Therefore, there was considerable anxiety regarding the possibility of a violent evolution in the more remote parts of the peasant community on Santiago and on other islands.
In early 1962 there was widespread panic among colonial authorities in the metropole that exactly this was about to happen, and that Cape Verdean administrators would in this process support rebel movements. Portuguese military officials believed that "subversive activities" and attempts at rebellion were prepared not only by the Cape Verdean community of Guinea-Bissau (where revolt finally started in 1963, with a huge number of Cape Verdean settlers among the sympathizers, and several even in the rank and file of the liberation movement), but also on the archipelago. Worries were so deep that the Portuguese military not only feared propaganda, sabotage acts, and terrorist attacks (notably against Sal Airport), but even a rebel take-over of one or more of the minor islands-including Fogo and Bravaand plans for the declaration of an independent state of Cape Verde! 69 In March 1962 Portuguese surveillance started to target Cape Verdean officials on the islands. Secret police observers began first to screen the activities of the Cape Verdean employees of the meteorological service on Sal Island, in the Barlavento (Windward) island group, before extending their activity towards other parts of the administration. 70 However, after thirty-six months during which Portuguese agents had eagerly sought possible traitors, and checked on reported rumours of ships landing clandestinely in São Vicente and Santiago, or had pursued individuals possibly attempting to steal weapons and ammunition from the army camps on the islands, the Portuguese government had to admit there were no signs of any organised rebel activity in Cape Verde. 71 In particular, most Cape Verdean officials remained astonishingly "loyal" to the colonial regime. A majority of those officials would after April 1974 migrate to Lisbon, into a sometimes inevitable, sometimes self-chosen exile.
Conclusion
The case of Cape Verdean administrators on the Sotavento Islands of Cape Verde between the 1930s and the 1960s shows that both changes in African elite participation within the Portuguese colonial empire, and the impact of the late colonial state as a system centred on issues of "modernisation" and welfare, were important for the process of creating a particular group identity during the phase preceding decolonisation. Cape Verde, as a Creole colony under a particularly repressive colonial system, seems to be an exceptional case. However, our analysis has shown that although the circumstances of the Cape Verdean process were indeed particular, they might nonetheless be an impressive indicator for the impact of late colonial policies: even under the repressive conditions of the Estado Novo, the effects of the late colonial state had strong repercussions.
This seems paradoxical at first. Laura Bigman has made the point that practical measures taken by successive Portuguese governments against drought and hunger in Cape Verde were not impressive in the 1940s and became only very slowly more effective in the 1950s. However, according to the definitions of a late colonial state committed to 'modernisation' and the provision of welfare, the Cape Verdean situation was now redefined as scandalous by the officials involved. Thus, the colonial administration could in the 1950s no longer evade the internal debate on its own shortcomings. Moreover, the participation of Cape Verdean administrators in the imperial structures became ever more widespread from 1930, and those administrators were now also natural participants in the discussion on the obligations the Portuguese empire had towards its populations.
Cape Verdean officials appear to be likely candidates for nationalist engagement, even in a repressive setting like the Portuguese colonial state, but, in the end, they were not. In this particular case, the mechanisms of the late colonial state had a very strong effect, this time in the sense of integrating potentially nationalist individuals. While the Cape Verdean administrative elite was discontent with its own role in the Portuguese Empire, and critical of the socio-economic situation on the islands, the modernisation and welfare discourse of the late colonial state allowed them to position themselves as the more active part of the system: after all, they were the "specialists" (if only through their locations of birth) addressed in the first line as being part of the modernisation process to come. Their opinions were thus sought by the colonial regime, even by a colonial regime that was essentially repressive and authoritarian in nature-with, nevertheless, a discourse that in the 1950s became indeed more paternalistic than racial and "exploitative."
The Diaspora situation of many Cape Verdean settlers in places like São Tomé e Príncipe or Angola, from where they sent back the image of other Africans as less civilised, might have contributed as well to make Cape Verdean officials consider themselves basically connected to the empire. This connection is, still, little analysed. Cape Verdean settlers from Angola very frequently transmitted the worst possible opinions about their Angolan neighbours. 72 On the roças, the cocoa plantations of São Tomé, the Cape Verdeans remained a group apart from the rest of the islanders: the principal news those settlers would eventually bring back to Cape Verde was about the other Africans on the plantations as being violent and quarrelsome. 73 Coming back as reports into the group of Cape Verdean officials, such descriptions did not help in producing sympathy among those officials for the cause of the rebels in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Most would, obviously, continue to see themselves as an imperial elite group-however, as an elite group that would contribute according to the objectives of the late colonial state to a paternalistic model of welfare creation, in which they would co-operate with the Portuguese colonial government. The modernisation or reform discourse of the late colonial state, flanked by first practical steps towards improvements, particularly appealed to the members of this elite group. In a scenario in which the colonial power did not cede an inch towards political decolonisation, the reformist agenda in social terms did only in its beginnings function as a vehicle of critique. After some years, critical administrators began to see themselves as agents of a social process that could only be imagined in imperial contexts. 
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